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I. INTRODUCTION
The policy underlying the Bankruptcy Code is to provide hon-
est debtors a "fresh start" while distributing to creditors a pro rata
share of the proceeds which a trustee obtains after liquidating the
nonexempt assets of the debtor's bankruptcy estate.' Individuals
who file bankruptcy have two primary goals: 1) to obtain a dis-
charge of financial obligations; and 2) to protect as many assets as
1. The Supreme Court described the policy as follows:
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to "relieve the honest
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start
afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business
misfortunes." This purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by
the courts as being of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the
honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property
which he owns at the time of the bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
pre-existing debt.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
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possible from creditors by utilizing exemption statutes which allow
debtors to retain certain assets.2 Tension develops between the
competing interests of the debtor and the debtor's creditors. The
debtor desires to retain as many assets as possible from claims of
creditors or the trustee appointed to liquidate assets in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. The creditors and the trustee seek to maxi-
mize assets in the estate and may object to a discharge if improper
acts are believed to have occurred prior to bankruptcy or during
the course of the case. A discharge in bankruptcy is a privilege
and not a matter of right.3 The denial of an individual's discharge
after his or her assets have become property of the bankruptcy
estate and subsequently liquidated for the benefit of creditors
deprives a debtor of the benefits sought by filing bankruptcy.
One of a bankruptcy lawyer's most difficult tasks is to advise a
client on exemption and asset planning prior to filing for bank-
ruptcy.4 Clients want direction and advice. A debtor-client who
seeks direction from bankruptcy counsel finds little comfort in
knowing that the Eighth Circuit recognizes "that separating ordi-
nary pre-bankruptcy planning from fraudulent action is difficult." 5
Unfortunately, it is difficult to provide clients with bankruptcy
planning advice which is absolute. Despite numerous attempts by
courts to define the legal boundaries of pre-bankruptcy planning,
and to further Congress' intent to give debtors a fresh start, few
clear rules exist. Each case seems to present new and distinct fac-
tual situations that are difficult to analyze in a consistent manner
with controlling authority and prior decisions.
A debtor-counsel's role is to advise clients of the benefits, risks
and responsibilities associated with a bankruptcy proceeding and
to develop an informed strategy in preparation for and the partici-
pation in the bankruptcy process. The purpose of this article is to
provide counsel with suggestions on how to advise clients in light
of the hodgepodge of judicial decisions on these issues. The article
includes a summary of the statutory law and significant decisions
2. See id.
3. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 447 (1973).
4. See Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 80 B.R. 953, 957 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
Bankruptcy estate planning was defined by the court as:
the conscious, directed effort on the part of a financially-besieged debtor to
liquidate personal assets which are not exempt from claims of general creditors
under the state debtor-creditor law, and to use the proceeds of that liquidation
to purchase, or pay down existing encumbrances on assets which are exempt
under state law, as a preliminary to the debtor's claim of exemption in those
assets in the subsequent bankruptcy case.
Id.
5. Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 880 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1989).
1993]
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which reveal factors considered by the courts as important in
determining whether pre-bankruptcy conduct or actions taken
during a bankruptcy case prevent a discharge in bankruptcy from
being granted. Additionally, it will provide practical suggestions
for counsel and debtor-clients to consider when preparing for
bankruptcy and participating in the bankruptcy process, to enable
them to accomplish the twin objectives of retaining assets and
obtaining a discharge.
II. THE LAW
A. APPLICABLE STATUTES
1. 11 US.C. § 727-Discharge Section
Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code, which will be the princi-
pal focus of this article, sets forth those circumstances under which
a Chapter 7 individual debtor will not be discharged of debts.6 A
6. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988). Section 727 provides as follows:
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless-
(1) the debtor is not an individual;
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an
officer of the estate charged with custody of property under this title,
has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has
permitted to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or
concealed-
(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the
filing of the petition; or
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition;
(3) the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to
keep or preserve any recorded information, including books,
documents, records, and papers, from which the debtor's financial
condition or business transactions might be ascertained, unless such
act or failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances of the
case;
(4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the
case-
(A) made a false oath or account;
(B) presented or used a false claim;
(C) gave, offered, received, or attempted to obtain money, property,
or advantage, or a promise of money, property, or advantage, for
acting or forbearing to act; or
(D) withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to possession
under this title, any recorded information, including books,
documents, records, .and papers, relating to the debtor's
property or financial affairs;
(5) the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily, before determination of
denial of discharge under this paragraph, any loss of assets or
deficiency of assets to meet the debtor's liabilities;
(6) the debtor has refused, in the case-
(A) to obey any lawful order of the court, other than an order to
respond to a material question or to testify;
(B) on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination, to respond
to a material question approved by the court or to testify, after
the debtor has been granted immunity with respect to the
matter concerning which such privilege was invoked; or
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"discharge" objection may be commenced by the trustee assigned
to the case, 7 a creditor or the United States Trustee against an indi-
vidual debtor under § 727. A successful objection to discharge
(C) on a ground other than the properly invoked privilege against
self-incrimination, to respond to a material question approved by
the court or to testify;
(7) the debtor has committed any act specified in paragraph (2), (3), (4),
(5), or (6) of this subsection, on or within one year before the date of
the filing of the petition, or during the case, in connection with
another case, under this title or under the Bankruptcy Act,
concerning an insider;
(8) the debtor has been granted a discharge under this section, under
section 1141 of this title, or under section 14, 371, or 476 of the
Bankruptcy Act, in a case commenced within six years before the date
of the filing of the petition;
(9) the debtor has been granted a discharge under section 1228 or 1328 of
this title, or under section 660 or 661 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a case
commenced within six years before the date of the filing of the
petition, unless payments under the plan in such case totaled at
least-
(A) 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims in such case; or
(BXi) 70 percent of such claims; and
(ii) the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith, and was the
debtor's best effort; or
(10) the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the
debtor after the order for relief under this chapter.
(b) Except as provided in section 523 of this title, a discharge under subsection
(a) of this section discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the
date of the order for relief under this chapter, and any liability on a claim
that is determined under section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen
before the commencement of the case, whether or not a proof of claim
based on any such debt or liability is filed under section 501 of this title, and
whether or not a claim based on any such debt or liability is allowed under
section 502 of this title.
(c) (1) The trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee may object to the
granting of a discharge under subsection (a) of this section.
(2) On request of a party in interest, the court may order the trustee to
examine the acts and conduct of the debtor to determine whether a
ground exists for denial of discharge.
(d) On request of the trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee, and after
notice and a hearing, the court shall revoke a discharge granted under
subsection (a) of this section if-
(1) such discharge was obtained through the fraud of the debtor, and the
requesting party did not know of such fraud until after the granting of
such discharge;
(2) the debtor acquired property that is property of the estate, or became
entitled to acquire property that would be property of the estate, and
knowingly and fraudulently failed to report the acquisition of or
entitlement to such property, or to deliver or surrender such property
to the trustee; or
(3) the debtor committed an act specified in subsection (a) (6) of this
section.
(e) The trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee may request a
revocation of a discharge-
(1) under subsection (d) (1) of this section within one year after such
discharge is granted; or
(2) under subsection (d) (2) or (d) (3) of this section before the later of-
(A) one year after the granting of such discharge; and
(B) the date the case is closed.
11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) (enumerating the duties of a Chapter 7 trustee).
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proceeding prevents a debtor from being discharged of any debt.8
2. 11 US. C § 523-Nondischargeability Section
Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, in contrast to § 727
which prevents all debt from being discharged, applies to credi-
tor-specific debts such as a loan from a particular bank to the
debtor. A successful "nondischargeability" action prevents a par-
ticular debt owed to the creditor commencing the action from
being discharged.9 However, it does not affect the discharge of
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) and (cX1) (1988).
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Section 523 provides as follows:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141,[,] 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this
title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(1) for a tax or a customs duty-
(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(aX2) or
507(aX7) of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed
or allowed;
(B) with respect to which a return, if required-
(i) was not filed; or
(ii) was filed after the date on which such return was last due,
under applicable law or under any extension, and after two
years before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or
willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax;(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing
of credit, to the extent obtained by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than
a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition;
(B) use of a statement in writing-
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such
money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent
to deceive; or
(C) for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer
debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $500
for "luxury goods or services" incurred by an individual debtor
on or within forty days before the order for relief under this title,
or cash advances aggregating more than $1,000 that are
extensions of consumer credit under an open end credit plan
obtained by an individual debtor on or within twenty days before
the order for relief under this title, are presumed to be
nondischargeable; "luxury goods or services" do not include
goods or services reasonably acquired for the support or
maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; an
extension of consumer credit under an open end credit plan is to
be defined for purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in the
Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.);(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this title, with the
name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is
owed, in time to permit-
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of
this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for
such timely filing; or
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of this
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subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for
a determination of dischargeability of such debt under one of
such paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual
knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing and request;
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity,
embezzlement, or larceny;
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection
with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court
of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial
law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but
not to the extent that-
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation
of law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to
section 402(a) (26) of the Social Security Act, or any such debt
which has been assigned to the Federal Government or to a State
or any political subdivision of such State); or(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony,
maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support;
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to
the property of another entity;
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to
and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation
for actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty-(A) relating to a tax of a kind not specified in paragraph (1) of this
subsection; or(B) imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred
before three years before the date of the filing of the petition;
(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program
funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit
institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received as an
educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless-
(A) such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment first
became due before 7 years (exclusive of any applicable
suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing
of the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will
impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's
dependents;
(9) for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a
motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was
intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance;
(10) that was or could have been listed or scheduled by the debtor in a
prior case concerning the debtor under this title or under the
Bankruptcy Act in which the debtor waived discharge, or was denied
a discharge under section 727(a) (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of this title, or
under section 14c(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), or (7) of such Act;(11) provided in any final judgment, unreviewable order, or consent order
or decree entered in any court of the United States or of any State,
issued by a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency, or
contained in any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor,
arising from any act of fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity committed with respect to any depository institution or
insured credit union; or
(12) for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill any commitment by the
debtor to a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency to
maintain the capital of an insured depository institution, except that
this paragraph shall not extend any such commitment which would
otherwise be terminated due to any act of such agency.(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a debt that was excepted
from discharge under subsection (aX1), (aX3), or (aX8) of this section, under
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other debt."° Creditors often file a complaint asserting both § 523
and § 727 claims, believing that this will increase the likelihood of
recovering some or all of the debt owed by the debtor to that cred-
itor. However, a creditor with a sound nondischargeability claim
should seriously consider not including § 727 claims in the § 523
complaint. The creditor's likelihood of recovering a debt that is
nondischargeable under § 523 by levying upon a debtor's assets is
greater when other debts have been discharged, because the cred-
itor with the nondischargeability judgment is not competing with
other creditors for the debtor's limited assets.
3. 11 US.C. § 522-Exemption Section
Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code, which does not directly
apply to discharge or nondischargeability issues, is important
because it is the operative section of the Bankruptcy Code which
allows a debtor to exempt certain property from being included in
a bankruptcy proceeding and permits the debtor to keep this
property." A principal focus of pre-bankruptcy planning is to
section 17a(1), 17a(3), or 17a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, under section 439A
of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087-3), or under section
733(g) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 294(f)) in a prior case
concerning the debtor under this title, or under the Bankruptcy Act, is
dischargeable in a case under this title unless, by the terms of subsection (a)
of this section, such debt is not dischargeable in the case under this title.
(c) (1) Except as provided in subsection (aX3XB) of this section, the debtor
shall be discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4),
or (6) of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor
to whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court
determines such debt to be excepted from discharge under paragraph
(2), (4), or (6), as the case may be, of subsection (a) of this section.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply in the case of a Federal depository
institutions regulatory agency seeking, in its capacity as conservator,
receiver, or liquidating agent for an insured depository institution, to
recover a debt described in subsection (aX2), (aX4), (aX6), or (aXll)
owed to such institution by an institution-affiliated party unless the
receiver, conservator, or liquidating agent was appointed in time to
reasonably comply, or for a Federal depository institutions regulatory
agency acting in its corporate capacity as a successor to such receiver,
conservator, or liquidating agent to reasonably comply, with
subsection (aX3XB) as a creditor of such institution-affiliated party with
respect to such debt.
(d) If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of a consumer debt
under subsection (aX2) of this section, and such debt is discharged, the court
shall grant judgment in favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable
attorney's fee for, the proceeding if the court finds that the position of the
creditor was not substantially justified, except that the court shall not award
such costs and fees if special circumstances would make the award unjust.
(e) Any institution-affiliated party of a depository institution or insured credit
union shall be considered to be acting in a fiduciary capacity with respect to
the purposes of subsection (aX4) or (11).
11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
10. Id.
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988). Section 522 allows states to determine whether federal
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maximize exemptions."2 Unless objections to the exemptions are
raised and sustained, the debtor is allowed to retain the exempt
property, even if the debtor is denied a discharge. 1 3
B. APPLICABILITY OF OBJECTIONS TO DISCHARGE
(SECTION 727) AND NONDISCHARGEABILITY
(SECTION 523) ACTIONS TO VARIOUS
CHAPTERS OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
An objection to discharge under § 727 is only applicable in a
Chapter 7 "liquidation" proceeding, 14 with the exception that it is
applicable in Chapter 11 "reorganization" proceedings in limited
circumstances." It applies to a Chapter 11 reorganization when
an individual's confirmed Chapter 11 plan of reorganization pro-
vides for liquidation of the assets, the individual does not engage in
business thereafter, and the individual would be denied a dis-
charge under § 727(a) if it were a Chapter 7 proceeding.' 6
It should be recognized that § 727 only applies to individu-
als.17 Section 523, likewise applicable only to individuals, is fully
applicable in individual Chapter 7, 11, 12 "farmer reorganization"
proceedings, and certain Chapter 13 "wage earner reorganiza-
tions" where payments under a plan have not been completed."
Only subsections 523(aX5), (8) and (9) directly apply to all
Chapter 13 proceedings.' 9 Theoretically, a Chapter 13 plan may
be confirmed despite the most egregious pre-bankruptcy conduct
where other factors suggest that the plan represents a good faith
attempt by the debtor to satisfy creditor claims.2 0 However, fac-
tors which would support a nondischargeability or objection to dis-
charge action are relevant to the good faith analysis.2 '
exemptions enumerated at 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), state exemptions, or either at the debtor's
option, may be utilized in a bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
12. See Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 80 B.R. 953, 957 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
13. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Lunday (In re Lunday), 100 B.R. 502, 507-09 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1989) (finding that an exemption claimed on a homestead was allowed but discharge was
denied).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(dX3) (1988).
16. Id.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 727(aX1) (1988).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (1988).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(aX2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
20. Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346, 1352 (8th Cir. 1990).
21. See id. at 1349 (finding of good faith by the bankruptcy court was clearly erroneous
where the principal claimant had been intentionally shot five times by the debtor);
Education Assistance Corp. v. Zellner (In re Zellner), 827 F.2d 1222, 1227 (8th Cir. 1987)
(finding that a plan discharging a student loan obligation was proposed in good faith and
also finding that the plan was a serious attempt to repay the student loan given debtor's
projected income and health problems); United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311,
1993]
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This article will principally focus on § 727 and actions which
relate to it. The factual circumstances which give rise to a § 523
action generally occur prior to consulting with counsel when most
obligations to creditors are incurred. Thus the facts are already
established, and pre-bankruptcy planning will have little effect on
a potential nondischargeability claim. However, conversion of col-
lateral such as the debtor's failure to turn over to a creditor the
proceeds from the unauthorized sale of a creditor's collateral, a
basis for a nondischargeability claim under § 523(aX6), periodically
occurs prior to a bankruptcy filing. A nondischargeability claim
will not succeed if collateral has been converted, unless it is estab-
lished that the conversion was willful and malicious.22
Debtors who willfully break security agreements are test-
ing the outer bounds of their right to a fresh start, but
unless they act with malice by intending or fully expect-
ing to harm the economic interests of the creditor, such a
breach of contract does not, in and of itself, preclude a
discharge.2 3
C. DISTINCTION BETWEEN DENYING AN EXEMPTION AND
DENYING A DISCHARGE
A claimed exemption in certain assets may be allowed even
though a discharge is denied.24 A comprehensive look at all trans-
actions is included in a discharge analysis, whereas an exemption
inquiry is far more limited.2' Exemptions may be denied where
fraudulent use of exemptions is determined to have occurred,
after considering such indicia of fraud as, inter alia, (1) conduct
intentionally designed to materially mislead or deceive creditors
317 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that a plan discharging a student loan obligation was not
proposed in good faith).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX6) (1988).
23. Barclays Am./Business Credit, Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 774 F.2d 875,882 (8th Cir.
1985) (finding that malice was not established where debtor's principal intended to keep
business going); see First Nat'l Bank v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 882 F.2d 302, 304-05 (8th Cir.
1989) (concluding that lease payments assigned to bank erroneously came into possession of
corporate debtor who spent money; principals who had intended to keep business going
filed bankruptcy and bank charges of embezzlement and willful and malicious injury were
dismissed).
24. See Armstrong v. Lunday (In re Lunday), 100 B.R. 502 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989). The
debtors in Lunday disclosed a transfer of $58,000 into a homestead exemption, although
they were not honest about the sources of the cash and they filed false schedules. Id. at 507-
08. They were allowed to retain the homestead exemption but were denied the discharge
because of their efforts to hide nonexempt assets from the trustee and creditors. Id. at 509.
25. Another distinction is that allowability of exemptions (where state exemptions are
used) is governed by state law and discharge actions are governed by federal law. Norwest
Bank of Neb. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 873 n.3, 876 (8th Cir. 1988).
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about the debtor's financial position or (2) use of credit to buy
exempt property.2 6 However, the factors relevant to finding
extrinsic fraud in a § 727(a) (denial of discharge) action apply to a
determination as to whether an exemption should be allowed.
Courts particularly focus on whether acquiring the exemption fur-
thers the following social policies:
1. To provide the debtor with property necessary for
physical survival;
2. To protect the dignity and the cultural and religious
identity of the debtor;
3. To enable the debtor to rehabilitate financially and
earn income in the future;
4. To protect the debtor's family from the adverse con-
sequences of impoverishment;
5. To shift the burden of providing the debtor and the
debtor's family with minimal financial support from
society to the debtor's creditors.28
D. PROCEDURAL RULES
A § 727 or § 523 action is commenced by filing a complaint
which commences an adversary proceeding governed by Bank-
ruptcy Rules 7001 to 7087.29 A nondischargeability or objection to
discharge complaint shall be filed not later than sixty days follow-
ing the first date set for the § 341 meeting of creditors.3 ° In a
Chapter 11 case, the complaint shall be filed not later than the first
date set for the hearing on confirmation. 31 The court may extend
the time for filing a complaint, on motion of a party in interest,
provided that the motion is made before the allotted time has
expired.32
Careful consideration as to whether the facts support and
strategy dictates fling a nondischargeability or objection to dis-
charge action should precede the commencement of such an
26. Abbott Bank-Hemingford v. Armstrong (In re Armstrong), 931 F.2d 1233, 1237-39
(8th Cir. 1991).
27. In re Smith, 113 B.R. 579, 585 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990); see also Hanson v. First Nat'l
Bank (In re Hanson), 848 F.2d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying discharge factors in
determining whether to sustain objection to exemption); Armstrong, 931 F.2d at 1239(noting that factors establishing extrinsic fraud in discharge analysis are the same as in
exemption objection analysis).
28. See Smith, 113 B.R. at 586.
29. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001-7087.
30. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a).
31. Id.
32. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(b).
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action. A motion to amend a § 727 complaint to add a § 523 count
after the expiration of the statute of limitations period may not be
granted because there is not "sufficient identity" between the
claims.33
If a discharge was obtained "through the fraud of the debtor,
and the requesting party did not know of such fraud until after the
granting of such discharge," an action to revoke the discharge may
be commenced within one year after the discharge was granted,
even if there was no objection to discharge within the sixty-day
requirement of Bankruptcy Rule 4004.34 The right to commence
a revocation action is a remedial right, however, which is difficult
to obtain and should not be relied upon as an alternative to
objecting to a discharge in a timely fashion. 5
E. BURDEN OF PROOF
An objection to discharge seeks a remedy with serious conse-
quences which courts do not grant lightly.36 Facts relevant to such
an objection are construed liberally in favor of the debtor and
strictly against the objecting party.37 The plaintiff generally has
the initial burden of proving an objection to discharge.38 On
appeal, a finding by the bankruptcy court of whether fraud
occurred is subject to the clearly erroneous standard. 39 Conse-
quently, bankruptcy decisions in discharge objection cases are not
often reversed on appeal.
The standard of proof in nondischargeability actions is the
"preponderance of the evidence," which allows bankruptcy courts
to "give collateral estoppel effect to those elements of the claim
that are identical to the elements required for discharge and
which were actually litigated and determined in the prior
33. See Austin Farm Ctr. v. Harrison (In re Harrison), 71 B.R. 457, 460 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1987). But see Bank of Chester County v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 139 B.R. 327, 335 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1992) (noting that Harrison failed to consider the "relating back" test arising from
the more liberal amendment standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) made
applicable to adversary proceedings by Bankruptcy Rule 7015).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 727(dXl), (eX1) (1988).
35. See Mid-Tech Consulting, Inc. v. Swendra (In re Swendra), 938 F.2d 885, 888 (8th
Cir. 1991) (holding that a dismissal of a revocation action under § 727(dXl) was proper
where the creditor knew of facts before discharge which put the creditor on notice of a
possible fraud); Doe v. Zimmerman (In re Zimmerman), 869 F.2d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 1989)
(finding that a creditor who did not file a timely objection to discharge was precluded from
seeking a revocation of discharge).
36. Ashton v. Burke (In re Burke), 83 B.R. 716, 720 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988).
37. Id.
38. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4005.
39. Jennen v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 771 F.2d 1126, 1129 n.3 (8th Cir. 1985).
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action."4 ° The standard of proof in an objection to discharge
action is, however, unresolved. Although previously determined
by many courts to be the clear and convincing standard, 41 most
courts since Grogan v. Garner42 have determined that the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard applies in objection to discharge
actions too.
4 3
That intent which an objecting party must prove in order to
sustain an objection to discharge is "actual intent." Actual intent is
distinguishable from constructive intent in that constructive intent
is inferred from facts as a matter of law without regard to the
debtor's actual intent.44 The courts nevertheless recognize that a
debtor will seldom directly admit to having the intent necessary to
deny a discharge. Consequently, courts will allow the requisite
intent to be established by circumstantial evidence with infer-
ences to be drawn from the actions of the debtor.45
The intent of one individual is generally not attributed to
another when making a denial of discharge determination. Intent
to defraud cannot be attributed from one spouse to the other
spouse, but must be proven with respect to each.46 In Walker v.
Citizens State Bank (In re Walker),47 the court held that the fraud
of the debtor's wife-agent, by itself, is not imputed to the debtor.48
In this nondischargeability action based on fraud, the court held
that actual participation in the fraud was not required and fraud
would readily be imputed if an agent knew or should have known
of the fraud.49 The court added that if the principal was recklessly
indifferent to the acts of the agent, it could be inferred that the
principal should have known of the fraud. 0 Similarly, malice or
intent of a conservator or guardian will not be imputed to an inca-
40. See Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 658 (1991) (finding that the preponderance of
the evidence standard balances fresh start policy with interest of limiting opportunity for a
new beginning to the "honest but unfortunate debtor").
41. See, e.g., Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 658-59.
42. 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991). See, e.g., St. Luke's Hosps. of Fargo, Inc. v. Smith (In re
Smith), 119 B.R. 714, 721 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990).
43. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 661 (1991). See United States v. Sumpter (In re
Sumpter), 136 B.R. 690, 693-94 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991); Applebaum v. Henderson (In re
Henderson), 134 B.R. 147, 150 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991); Union Bank v. Farouki (In re
Farouki), 133 B.R. 769, 776 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).
44. See McDonough v. Erdman (In re Erdman), 96 B.R. 978, 985 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988).
45. Id.
46. First Tex. Say. Ass'n, Inc. v. Reed, 700 F.2d 986, 993 (5th Cir. 1983).
47. 726 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1984).
48. Walker v. Citizens State Bank (In re Walker), 726 F.2d 452, 454 (8th Cir. 1984).
49. Id.
50. Id. Although Walker involved a nondischargeability action, the standard for
imputing an agent's intent to the principal would seem to be applicable to discharge
actions. But see United States v. Sumpter (In re Sumpter), 136 B.R. 690, 696 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1991) (disagreeing with cases suggesting that reckless disregard is equivalent to
1993]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
pacitated person on whose behalf the conservator or guardian was
acting.5 '
Fraudulent intent is presumed in § 727(aX2) cases where the
debtor has gratuitously conveyed valuable property.5 2 The bur-
den then shifts to the debtor to prove that there was no intent to
hinder, delay or defraud creditors.53 On rebuttal, the debtor must
prove that he or she did not commit the objectionable acts
alleged.54
III. SECTION 727 IN PRACTICE
A. TRANSFER, REMOVAL, DESTRUCTION, MUTILATION OR
CONCEALMENT OF PROPERTY (11 U.S.C. § 727(aX2))
1. Elements of an Objection to Discharge Under § 727(a)(2)
A debtor will be denied a discharge under § 727(aX2XA) or (B)
if the facts show that:
1. the debtor transferred, removed, destroyed, muti-
lated or concealed or permitted the same to be done,
2. to the debtor's property,
3. within one year preceding the case filing or during
case pendency,
4. with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a
creditor.55
2. What Is a Transfer?
The vast majority of cases addressing actions under § 727(aX2),
especially those with pre-bankruptcy exemption planning, focus
on the "transfer" element of that section. Transfer is interpreted
broadly and all inclusive. It means "every mode, direct or indi-
rect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing
of or parting with property or with an interest in property, includ-
ing retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the
debtor's equity of redemption." ' The legislative history also con-
fraudulent intent but concluding that reckless disregard as to the truth of a statement is
tantamount to knowledge of its falsity for purposes of that element of § 727(aX4)).
51. St. Luke's Hosps. of Fargo, Inc. v. Smith (In re Smith), 119 B.R. 714, 721 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1990) (finding that a purchase of annuities with $90,000 of settlement proceeds did
not cause discharge of incapacitated person to be denied).
52. Abbott Bank-Hemingford v. Armstrong (In re Armstrong), 931 F.2d 1233, 1239
(8th Cir. 1991).
53. Id.
54. See Shainman v. Shear's of Affton, 387 F.2d 33, 37 (8th Cir. 1967).
55. McDonough v. Erdman (In re Erdman), 96 B.R. 978, 985 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1988).
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firms that the definition of transfer is not a limiting term."
The courts likewise interpret "transfer" broadly. In City
National Bank v. Bateman,5" the court held that the incorporation
of a grocery store previously owned jointly by husband and wife,
with the wife becoming a 100% shareholder, constituted a transfer
which resulted in the denial of a discharge.59 In Conti-Commodity
Services, Inc. v. Clausen, 0 the court held that the loss of a home-
stead by default in a divorce proceeding was a transfer which
occurred with the intent to defraud creditors.6 ' Accordingly, the
discharge was denied.62
Notwithstanding the broad interpretation of what constitutes
a "transfer," there are limitations. A transfer of assets by a corpo-
ration in which the debtor owns fifty percent of the shares does
not constitute a transfer of property of the debtor because the
debtor did not have a direct proprietary interest in the property. 3
The Ninth Circuit in First Beverly Bank v. Adeeb (In re Adeeb ),64
held that a transfer was not deemed to have occurred if the trans-
fer was reversed prior to the bankruptcy petition filing or was in
the process of being reversed at the time of an involuntary filing.65
Counsel should not assume that Adeeb would be adopted in the
Eighth Circuit, where the issue has not been ruled upon, given
that the Eleventh Circuit has rejected the Adeeb analysis. 66  An
57. Congress' intent in adopting an expansive view of "transfer" is clear.
A transfer is a disposition of an interest in property. The definition of transfer is
as broad as possible. Many of the potentially limiting words in current law are
deleted, and the language is simplified. Under this definition, any transfer of an
interest in property is a transfer, including a transfer of possession, custody, or
control even if there is no transfer of title, because possession, custody, and
control are interests in property. A deposit in a bank account or similar account
is a transfer.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5813; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 314 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6271.
58. 646 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981).
59. City Nat'l Bank v. Bateman (In re. Bateman), 646 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (8th Cir.
1981).
60. 44 B.R. 41 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
61. Conti-Commodity Serv., Inc. v. Clausen (In re Clausen), 44 B.R. 41, 43-46 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1984).
62. Id. at 46.
63. MCorp. Management Solutions, Inc. v. Thurman (In re Thurman), 901 F.2d 839,
841 (10th Cir. 1990).
64. 787 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1986).
65. First Beverly Bank v. Adeeb (In re Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339, 1345 (9th Cir. 1986).
Upon the advice of counsel, the debtor in Adeeb revised most of his original transfers prior
to being forced into involuntary bankruptcy by his creditors. Id. at 1341-42.
66. Davis v. Davis (In re Davis), 911 F.2d 560, 562 (11 th Cir. 1990). The court in Davis
rejected Adeeb on the basis that the language of § 727(aX2XA) is plain and unambiguous and
that "transferred" does not mean "transferred and remained transferred." Id. The court
held that a transfer for § 727(a) purposes occurred and the debtor was denied a discharge
even though the transfer was reversed pre-petition. Id.
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ability to reverse transfers prior to filing and to preserve the dis-
charge, as recognized in Adeeb, is a valuable remedial tool in
courts where the Adeeb rationale is followed. It is a remedial
cleansing mechanism for counsel involved in a case where inap-
propriate transfers previously occurred.
3. "'Extrinsic" Evidence of Fraud Supporting Denial of
Discharge Under f 727(a)(2)
Perfectly legitimate actions may "delay or hinder creditors...
in the ordinary, nonlegal sense," but these acts are not the sort of
hindrances covered by fraudulent transfer law or the Bankruptcy
Code. 67  "[A] debtor's conversion of nonexempt property to
exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy for the express purpose
of placing that property beyond the reach of creditors, without
more, will not deprive the debtor of the exemption to which he
otherwise would be entitled. 68
The Eighth Circuit in Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson )69
recognized the following nonexclusive factors as constituting indi-
cia of extrinsic evidence of fraud:
1. Further conduct intentionally designed to materially
mislead or deceive creditors about the debtor's
position;
2. Conveyances for less than fair value;
3. Continued retention, benefit or use of property
allegedly conveyed together with evidence that the
conveyance was for inadequate consideration; and
4. Where an exemption, other than a homestead, is not
limited in amount, the amount of property con-
verted into exempt forms and the form taken may
be considered."
Additional factors also constitute such evidence:
5. The debtor obtained credit to purchase exempt
assets;
6. The conversion occurred after the entry of a large
judgment against the debtor;
67. Armstrong, 931 F.2d at 1238.
68. Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Hanson), 848 F.2d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 1988); see
Wilder Health Care Ctr. v. Elholm (In re Elholm), 80 B.R. 964, 969 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987)
(stating that the meaning of hinder and delay is not a semantic exercise but must be
determined in light of the purpose of § 727(a) and the Bankruptcy Code).
69. 880 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1989).
70. Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 880 F.2d 78, 82 (8th Cir. 1989).
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7. The debtor had engaged in a pattern of sharp deal-
ing prior to bankruptcy; and
8. That the conversion rendered the debtor
insolvent.7
1
The North Dakota Bankruptcy Court has applied some of these
factors along with certain others including:
9. The family, friendship or close associate relationship
between the parties; and
10. The failure to schedule transfers of assets.72
4. Application of Selected Extrinsic Fraud Factors
a. Conduct Designed to Mislead or Deceive Creditors
Debtors must be very careful not to make misrepresentations
when engaging in negotiations prior to bankruptcy. Whenever a
debtor becomes involved in making misrepresentations to a credi-
tor which has the effect of misleading the creditor, the discharge is
put at risk. In McCormick v. Security State Bank (In re McCor-
mick ),73 an Iowa debtor was denied a discharge where he had
engaged in the liquidation of assets to buy an exempt home and
lied to his bank by stating that he was unable to make a payment
when he had $55,000 to $60,000 in cash subject to his disposition
at that time.74 The debtor concealed the cash prior to acquiring
his home by depositing funds in a credit union outside the state
and by depositing additional funds in his wife's account. 75 The
Eighth Circuit determined that the debtor intended to hinder or
delay the creditor in collecting on the note and that the property
was transferred in execution of that intent when funds were with-
drawn from the accounts and transferred into the house.76 The
court concluded that concealment from the creditor constituted
concealment under § 727 because the intent to hinder and delay
collection was quite clear.77 Although a finding of fraud requires
more than a failure to volunteer information to creditors,78 inten-
71. Smiley v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Smiley), 864 F.2d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 1989).
72. See McDonough v. Erdman (In re Erdman), 96 B.R. 978, 985 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988).
The court denied the debtor's discharge due to the debtor's egregious conduct, which
included the wholesale transfers of assets, nondisclosure and failure to explain asset
deficiency. Id. at 989.
73. 822 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1987).
74. McCormick v. Security State Bank (In re McCormick), 822 F.2d 806, 807-08 (8th
Cir. 1987).
'75. Id. at 807.
76. Id. at 808.
77. Id.
78. Smiley v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Smiley), 864 F.2d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 1989).
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tional deception designed with the hope that creditors will refrain
from pursuing remedies is a basis for denying discharge.7 9
b. Continued Retention and Use of Property
The plain language of § 727(aX2) suggests that as long as trans-
fers occur more than a year prior to bankruptcy filing, the dis-
charge will not be jeopardized. However, the "continued
concealment doctrine" is used by courts in concluding that certain
transactions which facially occurred more than a year prior to
bankruptcy constitute transfer or concealment within the year
prior to bankruptcy.80 Concealing property under § 727(aX2XA)
occurs by a transfer of title coupled with retention of the benefits
of ownership.8 ' Even if a transfer occurs several years prior to
bankruptcy, the continued concealment doctrine provides that
the concealment, with the requisite intent, into the year prior to
bankruptcy, puts the transaction within the one year requirement
of § 727(aX2XA).8 2
As with most objections to discharge, application of the con-
tinued concealment doctrine is very fact specific. In Bennett &
Kahnweiler Associates v. Ratner (In re Ratner ),83 the debtor trans-
ferred his interest in a home to his spouse several years prior to
bankruptcy, arguably when still solvent.84 The debtor had depos-
ited his salary into his wife's bank account to be used for household
purposes, after his account was involuntarily closed.8 5 The court
held that the debtor did not intend to hinder, delay or defraud
creditors and was not denied a discharge.86 However, in another
instance a small prepayment of future obligations was held to be
79. See First Tex. Sav. Ass'n, Inc. v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1983)
(finding that conversion of nonexempt assets to reduce home mortgage after arranging with
creditors to be free of payment obligations until following year evidenced fraudulent
intent); Smiley, 864 F.2d at 568 (denying a discharge because the debtor misrepresented
asset values and transactions at several creditor meetings before bankruptcy and caused
creditors to stand still long enough to allow debtor to establish residency in another state to
take advantage of homestead exemption there).
80. Penner v. Penner (In re Penner), 107 B.R. 171, 175 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
81. Thibodeaux v. Olivier (In re Olivier), 819 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1987).
82. Id. at 555.
83. 132 B.R. 728 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
84. Bennett & Kahnweiler Assocs. v. Ratner (In re Ratner), 132 B.R. 728, 732-33 (N.D.
Ill. 1991).
85. Id.
86. Id. (concluding that debtor had no obligation to open an account in his name or to
share an account with his wife and that debtor had no obligation to retain attachable
property for the benefit of his judgment creditors). But see Friedell v. Kauffman (In re
Kauffman), 675 F.2d 127, 128 (7th Cir. 1981) (concluding that debtor who transferred home
to his wife but retained all beneficial interest, including scheduling on financial statement
and using as collateral for loans, was denied a discharge).
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sufficient to deny discharge. 7
c. Amount of Transfer and Form of Property
Much of the judicial discretion in reviewing transfers of non-
exempt into exempt property has traditionally focused on the
value of the transfer and the form of property into which the funds
ultimately were transferred.
A classic example of a large transfer is discussed in Norwest
Bank Nebraska, N.A. v. Tveten (In re Tveten ),88 in which the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of a dis-
charge after the debtor liquidated his nonexempt assets and con-
verted over $700,000 into certain nonhomestead assets which the
debtor thought were exempt.8 9 The Eighth Circuit noted that the
debtor's actions evidenced a desire for a "head start" and not a
"fresh start 90 and opined that "where a pig becomes a hog it is
slaughtered."-91 The Tveten court suggested that the state exemp-
tion relied upon was unlimited and therefore provided the poten-
tial for unlimited abuse. The court in Tveten found that the
debtor's conduct went well beyond the social policies underlying
exemptions; however, the court did not provide any clear guide-
lines as to when liberal exemptions are deemed to be unlimited.92
The Eighth Circuit in Hanson v. First National Bank (In re
Hanson ),93 decided the same day as Tveten, applied the Tveten dis-
charge analysis to an exemption objection with facts similar to
Tveten, and allowed an exemption with transfers similar to
Tveten. 94 However, in Hanson only $35,000 was transferred into
exempt assets, including life insurance policies and pay down of a
homestead mortgage, which indicates that the amount being
87. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Zouhar (In re Zouhar), 10 B.R. 154, 158 (Bankr. D.N.M.
1981) (finding that prepayment of $1,860 of son's school tuition three months before due
was a transfer with intent to defraud creditors in a case under the Bankruptcy Act).
88. 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988).
89. Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveten (In re Tveten) 848 F.2d 871, 872-73 (8th Cir.
1988); see McDonough v. Erdman (In re Erdman), 96 B.R. 978 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988). The
discharge was denied because there were wholesale gratuitous transfers of assets, and
conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt assets exceeded social policies underlying
exemption. Id. at 986.
90. Tveten, 848 F.2d at 876.
91. Id. at 879 (quoting Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Zouhar (In re Zouhar), 10 B.R. 154,
157 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981)). See also NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Bowyer, 916 F.2d 1056, 1056
(5th Cir. 1990), rev'd on reh'g, 932 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that the bankruptcy
court's holding that spending spree including use of cash and not bank deposits for travel,
home improvements and other exempt assets was not clearly erroneous and the discharge
was allowed).
92, Tveten, 848 F.2d at 876.
93. 848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988).
94. Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Hanson), 848 F.2d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1988).
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transferred is an important factor.95 Another distinction was that
state law limited insurance exemptions to $20,000 in Hanson
whereas Tveten had an unlimited exemption.96 Finally, the debtor
in Tveten was a practicing physician and the debtors in Hanson
were farmers.97 In both cases, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's finding relative to the presence and absence of fraud-
ulent intent because that finding was not clearly erroneous.9
In the Eighth Circuit, the safest method of transferring cash
or proceeds from nonexempt assets is by the acceleration of pay-
ments on a homestead mortgage.9 The Eighth Circuit in Panuska
v. Johnson unequivocally stated that the power sanctioned in
Tveten to look at the money involved should be reserved for
exceptional cases and had no application to homestead exemptions
because such exemptions are central to state exemption laws. 100
Under Panuska v. Johnson, the pay down of $175,000 on a mort-
gage on an exempt homestead did not jeopardize a discharge. 01
A question unanswered by Panuska v. Johnson is whether a
debtor with liquid nonexempt assets which exceed the homestead
mortgage balance may sell the homestead and buy a larger home
as a means of preserving the nonexempt assets. The Eighth Cir-
cuit has not precluded the acquisition of a more expensive home
prior to a bankruptcy filing, although it could be argued that such
an action goes beyond the social policy of the homestead exemp-
tion, which under the Minnesota exemption construed in Panuska
v. Johnson is to protect a homestead of the debtor and not neces-
sarily to allow the debtor to buy a more expensive home.10 2
A Minnesota bankruptcy court in In re Johnson,1°3 citing the
Eighth Circuit Panuska v. Johnson decision, did not find extrinsic
evidence of fraud and therefore allowed an exemption by a debtor
who had not owned a home but who purchased a home for
$45,000 a few hours before filing bankruptcy.10 4 Similarly, in Park
National Bank v. Whitney (In re Whitney ),105 the debtor obtained
95. Id. at 867.
96. Id. at 867; Tveten, 848 F.2d at 873.
97. Hanson, 848 F.2d at 867; Tteten, 848 F.2d at 872.
98. Hanson, 848 F.2d at 869; Tveten, 848 F.2d at 876-77.
99. Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 880 F.2d 78, 83-84 (8th Cir. 1989).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 79, 83-84.
102. See Denzen v. Prendergast, 126 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. 1964).
103. No. 6-88-594, 1989 WL 81184 (Bankr. D. Minn. July 21, 1989).
104. In re Johnson, No. 6-88-594, 1989 WL 81184, at *3 (Bankr. D. Minn. July 21, 1989).
105. 107 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989).
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$400,335 in excess proceeds from a letter of credit draw.10 6 The
proceeds from the letter of credit were kept in the debtor's attor-
ney's trust account in part to keep the funds away from credi-
tors.' °7 The funds were ultimately used to pay for a $280,000
home three months prior to filing bankruptcy, at a time when the
debtor did not own another home.'08 Although this case dealt with
objections to the homestead exemption, and not an objection to
discharge, the extrinsic evidence of fraud factors applicable to an
objection to discharge were applied.' 0 9 Finding no fraud, the
court overruled objections to the claimed exemption. 1 0
The ultimate irony in the Eighth Circuit Panuska v. Johnson
decision is that the case was remanded to determine whether the
debtor acted with an intent to "hinder, delay, and defraud credi-
tors" when he liquidated assets to acquire a life insurance policy
with a $4,000 cash value, a baby grand piano, and an $8,000 harp-
sichord, all of which were exempt under state law."' The debtor
was denied a discharge because of these transfers."12 Extrinsic evi-
dence of fraud was established because the insurance policy was
acquired with the intent to be liquidated after bankruptcy to pro-
vide ready cash, which it subsequently was, and because the
debtor did not know how to play the musical instruments nor did
anyone in the family domicile." 3 The bankruptcy court on
remand found that the debtor did not acquire any of these assets
for the purpose which the legislature sought to advance in
allowing them to be declared exempt." 4
d. Family Relationship Between Parties
Family transfers are generally suspect. A presumption of
fraud arises when property is transferred to relatives, in conjunc-
tion with other circumstances." 5 Courts have found that a sale of
assets to family members for fair consideration, without more,
106. Park Nat'l Bank v. Whitney (In re Whitney), 107 B.R. 645, 648 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1989).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 650, 653.
110. Id. at 654.
111. See Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 124 B.R. 290, 292 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
112. Id. at 297.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Pavy v. Chastant (In re Chastant), 873 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that
gratuitous transfer of property into family trust evidenced fraudulent intent and discharge
was denied).
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does not constitute fraud. 116 However, the perils of transferring
assets to family members, even for apparent fair value, are illus-
trated in Wilder Health Care Center v. Elholm (In re Elholm ).117
In Elholm, the debtor sold property to his wife and children, pre-
sumably paid for with the wife's and children's funds, which the
court found the debtor and his wife had generated during the
course of their marriage, for mutually beneficial family uses. 8
The court concluded that the funds in the wife's bank account
were property of their marital community and not the wife's
alone."1 9 The court determined that the debtor did not intend to
defraud, but had the requisite intent to hinder and delay; conse-
quently, the discharge was denied. 121
Transactions between family members will be even more sus-
pect when the transaction is unusual on its face. The Fourth Cir-
cuit has held that a husband who transferred an interest in real
estate to himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety with the
right of survivorship one day after a judgment was entered against
him to allegedly correct a six-month old mistake in a prior deed,
acted with the intent to defraud.1 2 1 Consequently, the court held
that he was not entitled to a discharge. 122 However, the Seventh
Circuit has held that fraud was not established by a "relinquish-
ment" of a tenancy by the entirety interest from one spouse to
another to allocate property in contemplation of divorce, even
though the couple did not divorce, because the assets available to
the creditors were not diminished by the transfer.12 3
A debtor should be as cautious about disposing of property of a
marital estate, in violation of or to circumvent a divorce decree, as
the debtor should generally be when disposing of property held
for another. Several courts have denied a discharge of the con-
verting spouse's debts, when the spouse converted the property or
funds prior to or after a bankruptcy filing.12 4
116. See Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Hanson), 848 F.2d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1988)
(finding that proceeds from sale were used to pay down mortgage on home).
117. 80 B.R. 964 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
118. Wilder Health Care Ctr. v. Elholm (In re Elholm), 80 B.R. 964, 970-71 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1987).
119. Id.
120. id.
121. Ford v. Poston (In re Ford), 773 F.2d 52, 53, 55 (4th Cir. 1985).
122. Id. at 55.
123. Lee Supply Corp. v. Agnew (In re Agnew), 818 F.2d 1284, 1285-86 (7th Cir. 1987).
124. See Gepfrich v. Gepfrich (In re Gepfrich), 118 B.R. 135, 138-39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1990) (finding extrinsic evidence of fraud and denying discharge of debtor who filed
bankruptcy after converting proceeds of marital asset into exempt annuity over which
divorce decree had given debtor control to allow flexibility in making alimony and child
support payments); Lanker v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 101 B.R. 39, 48-50 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
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B. DISCHARGE DENIED WHERE DEBTOR MAINTAINS POOR
RECORDS OR No RECORDS-li U.S.C. § 727(aX3)
Section 727(aX3) provides that a debtor will be denied a dis-
charge if the debtor "concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or
failed to keep or preserve any recorded information . . . from
which the debtor's financial condition or business transactions
might be ascertained . . . unless . . . justified."'125 This section is
meant to assure that the estate will be provided with sufficient
information to assess the debtor's estate and financial posture. It
will be applied on a case-by-case basis according to the special
characteristics of the debtor's occupation, business and personal
financial structure. 126
There is no absolute obligation to keep books and records.' 27
A party challenging the adequacy of a debtor's records has the ini-
tial burden of proving that the records are inadequate.12 8 The
burden then shifts to the debtor to justify the absence of complete
records. 2 19  The test adopted by the Third Circuit is whether
"'there [is] available written evidence made and preserved from
which the present financial condition of the bankrupt, and his
business transactions for a reasonable period in the past may be
ascertained.' "130 Factors considered in determining whether the
debtor's records are adequate include: the debtor's education,
business experience and sophistication, the volume and complex-
ity of the debtor's business or finances, the amount of credit
extended to the debtor and any other relevant circumstances. 13 1
Although formal records are not required of every debtor, the
financial history of complex business transactions for those
required to keep records requires a paper trail more detailed than
boxes of cancelled checks and documents.' 32
1989) (holding that the debtor was denied a discharge where the bankruptcy was a
conscious scheme of the debtor undertaken to frustrate a divorce decree).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 727(aX3) (1988).
126. Peoples State Bank v. Drenckhahn (In re Drenckhahn), 77 B.R. 697, 707 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1987).
127. Jaffe v. Nguyen (In re Nguyen), 100 B.R. 581, 583 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989)
(determining that it was conceivable, based on debtor's simplistic financial affairs, that
debtor did not keep books and records, thus a discharge objection was not sustained).
128. American Motors Leasing Corp. v. Morando (In re Morando), 116 B.R. 14, 15
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1990).
129. Id.
130. Meridian Bank v. Alten (In re Alten), 958 F.2d 1226, 1230 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted).
131. Id. at 1231. The court found that the debtors who elected to operate with cash,
and without bank accounts, after creditors began levying were not justified in failing to
maintain adequate records and therefore the discharge was denied. Id. at 1234.
132. See Morando, 116 B.R. at 16-17 (holding that a lack of formal education did not
justify inadequate records for a debtor who was "no small Mom and Pop operator").
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Courts will, however, consider reasonable explanations in
determining whether the failure to keep adequate records is justi-
fied. In Cox v. Lansdowne (In re Cox), 3 ' which involved a mas-
sive securities fraud scheme, the court held that when a married
couple share a duty to maintain records under § 727(aX3), the
"court should not refuse to consider one spouse's reliance on the
other in determining whether a failure to keep records was justi-
fied under all the circumstances of the case.' ' 34
C. DISCHARGE DENIED WHEN DEBTOR KNOWINGLY
MAKES A FALSE OATH OR FALSE CLAIM, COMMITS
BRIBERY OR WITHHOLDS RECORDED
INFORMATION FROM AN OFFICER OF THE
ESTATE-ll U.S.C. § 727(aX4)
One of the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code is that a
debtor complete and file a series of schedules and forms contain-
ing questions relating to the debtor's assets, liabilities and financial
affairs.13 5 The discharge may be denied if the debtor fails to com-
ply with this obligation.'3 6 Many times a debtor files schedules in
haste and errors inadvertently occur. Nevertheless, false sched-
ules may be considered a reckless indifference to the truth and the
equivalent of fraud unless the debtor promptly amends the sched-
ules to correct the errors.' 37 Errors or omissions on these forms,
which are signed under oath, can result in a denial of a discharge if
the false oath was knowingly and fraudulently made and was
"material.' 38 The subject matter of a false oath is material if it
bears a relationship to the debtor's business transactions or estate,
or if it concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the
existence and disposition of the debtor's property. 139
The fact that items omitted are of no value is not necessarily a
defense to nondisclosure. 40 The purpose of disclosure is to allow
creditors the opportunity to review and investigate assets and
transactions. A debtor has no discretion in deciding which ques-
133. 904 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1990).
134. Cox v. Lansdowne (In re Cox), 904 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990).135. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988).
136. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(aX4) (1988).
137. Drewes v. Magnuson (In re Magnuson), 113 B.R. 555, 559 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989).
138. Ashton v. Burke (In re Burke), 83 B.R. 716, 720 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988).
139. Palatine Nat'l Bank v. Olson (In re Olson), 916 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1990).
140. Job v. Calder (In re Calder), 907 F.2d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that an
omission of two bank accounts, ownership interest in mineral rights and partnership
interest (although presumably of no value), was basis for denying discharge to bankruptcy
lawyer).
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tions on the bankruptcy schedules to answer or which assets to dis-
close.' 4 ' However, it is recognized that legitimate errors in the
disclosure process occur.' 42
The Eighth Circuit has been unforgiving in nondisclosure
cases, even where the value of assets at issue are relatively nomi-
nal. In Mertz v. Rott (In re Rott),143 the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the bankruptcy court which held that the nondisclosure of a
$1,358 tax refund, which represented 5.8% of the assets and 1.5%
of total liabilities, was material and was a valid basis to deny dis-
charge even where the property, had it been disclosed, would
have been exempt and would not have been available for distribu-
tion to creditors.'44 In Rott, the debtor had given three false oaths
and had failed to correct the nondisclosure on three separate
occasions. 145
In Palatine National Bank v. Olson (In re Olson ), 146 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial of a discharge
to a debtor businessman who had sold his stock in a corporation to
his wife six years before the debtor's bankruptcy filing.' 47 His wife
eventually became president of the corporation and general man-
ager of the dinner theater operated by the corporation. 48 The
debtor omitted any reference to the corporation or to the dinner
theater on his bankruptcy schedules.' 49  The Eighth Circuit
upheld the bankruptcy court's finding of intentional nondisclosure
evidenced by: (1) the debtor investing significant money in the
theater after the sale of his stock, (2) the debtor having arranged
all financing, and (3) the debtor's wife having had no experience in
the development of such projects.15 0 The bankruptcy court found
141. Burke, 83 B.R. at 721. The court held that the exclusion of a professional practice
on asset schedules of a dentist was due to confusion and not an intent to omit relevant data,
and dismissed a complaint objecting to the discharge. The court found that the personal
services of a dentist in a dental practice do not constitute estate property and are too
speculative to value, but that patient records and files may have value and should be
disclosed. Id. at 721-22.
142. See, e.g., Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Bernard (In re Bernard), 99
B.R. 563, 570 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). The court opined that:
[a] debtor's omission of items without intent to conceal them from creditors, due
either to inadvertence or because the property is not the type that comes to
mind when listing one's disposable property, would not constitute a knowingly
false statement under oath made by a debtor with intent to defraud creditors.
Id.
143. 955 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1992).
144. Mertz v. Rott (In re Rott), 955 F.2d 596, 598 (8th Cir. 1992).
145. Id. at 598-99.
146. 916 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1990).
147. Palatine Nat'l Bank v. Olson (In re Olson), 916 F.2d 481, 483-84 (8th Cir. 1990).
148. Id. at 483.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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that the debtor "controlled the project in concept, development,
and operation.' 15 ' The bankruptcy court noted that the theater
was of questionable value.'- 2 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit,
concluding that value was not determinative, held that the omis-
sion was material because it related in a substantial way to the
debtor's business transactions and his estate.1 5 3
The North Dakota Bankruptcy Court has been equally unsym-
pathetic with debtors who are not truthful. In Drewes v.
Magnuson (In re Magnuson ),"4 the debtors reported cash on orig-
inal schedules in the amount of $218 when they actually had
$1,168 which included $400 in a drawer set aside for their son's
tuition.155 The debtors' discharges were revoked and they were
not allowed to exempt the cash included on amended schedules
because the debtors fraudulently failed to disclose the cash and did
not immediately amend their schedules when they allegedly
became aware of the error.' 56
Courts seem to focus on whether assets are disclosed and not
on whether the assets may have been undervalued, presumably
believing that if the assets are disclosed, the trustee or creditors
can ascertain the value. Although assets should never be under-
valued intentionally, undervalued assets which are otherwise
properly listed in a debtor's schedules have been held to be an
insufficient basis to deny discharge. 157
D. FAILURE TO EXPLAIN LOSS OF ASSETS-11 U.S.C.
§ 727(aX5)
Many creditors and some trustees routinely suspect that a
debtor has secreted assets. A debtor must be prepared to ade-
quately account for assets which existed prior to the bankruptcy
filing. A debtor may be denied a discharge if he or she is unable to
do so.' 5 8 Although it is the party objecting to a discharge who
bears the burden of persuasion, this evidentiary rule does not elim-
inate a debtor's obligation to provide a satisfactory explanation for
151. Palatine Nat'l Bank v. Olson (In re Olson), 98 B.R. 944, 953 n.14 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1988).
152. Id. at 953.
153. Olson, 916 F.2d at 484.
154. 113 B.R. 555 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989).
155. Drewes v. Magnuson (In re Magnuson), 113 B.R. 555, 558-59 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1989).
156. Id. at 558-60.
157. See Wines v. Wines (In re Wines), 114 B.R. 794, 797 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990).
158. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(aX5) (1988).
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missing assets.' 59 "Vague and indefinite explanations of losses that
are based upon estimates uncorroborated by documentation are
unsatisfactory. "160
Objections to discharge premised upon a failure to account for
assets are often pursued in conjunction with an objection based on
a failure to keep adequate records.' 61 These types of claims rou-
tinely arise in instances where individuals dispose of significant
assets prior to bankruptcy, often for cash, and are unable to
account for the asset disposition or proceeds. 62
In one instance, debtors were denied a discharge because they
were unable to provide documentation to account for the use of
approximately $18,000 of $54,000 at their disposal during fourteen
months prior to bankruptcy, which the debtors stated was used for
cash purchases. 163 A debtor's explanation that the loss of assets is
due to unsubstantiated gambling losses is unsatisfactory. 16 4  A
debtor must be prepared to provide corroborating papers and doc-
umentation to support an explanation of asset deficiency when the
debtor's testimony does not bear sufficient credibility. 65
E. REFUSAL TO OBEY ORDER OF COURT OTHER THAN
ORDER TO TESTIFY-11 U.S.C. § 727(aX6)
A debtor who elects to seek the relief afforded by bankruptcy
must play by the bankruptcy rules.' 66  A debtor will not be
granted a discharge if the debtor fails to obey a lawful order of the
159. Reed v. First Tex. Sav. Ass'n (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 992-93 (5th Cir. 1983).
160. Meridian Bank v. Alten, 958 F.2d 1226, 1233 (3d Cir. 1992).
161. See, e.g., Chalik v. Moorefield (In re Chalik), 748 F.2d 616, 620 (11th Cir. 1984).
162. See Grant v. Simmons (In re Simmons), 113 B.R. 741, 742-45 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990) (finding that a debtor who had closed depository accounts after being sued by
creditors was denied discharge because of an inability to account for a decline in assets from
$6,000,000 to $80,932 during a two-year period prior to the bankruptcy); Manhattan
Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Goblick (In re Goblick), 93 B.R. 771, 775-76 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
In Goblick the debtor husband, whose net worth declined from in excess of $8,000,000
eight months prior to bankruptcy to a negative $3,000,000 before the bankruptcy filing, was
denied a discharge for failure to maintain extensive records and for failure to explain
disposition of assets. Id. at 775-76. The husband's co-debtor housewife, with no
independent income, was nevertheless justified in not maintaining records, and was
granted a discharge, although the explanation of the loss of a diamond ring was
questionable. Id.
163. Jessell v. Sword (In re Sword), 93 B.R. 757, 760 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988). See Reed,
700 F.2d at 989 (finding that an explanation that unaccounted disposition of $19,586 of cash
was used for cash purchases without receipts was insufficient).
164. See Dignam v. McMahon (In re McMahon), 116 B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990) (concluding that a debtor's explanation that $25,500 was lost gambling was not
sufficient account of diminution of assets).
165. See Peoples State Bank v. Drenckhahn (In re Drenckhahn), 77 B.R. 697, 710
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); McDonough v. Erdman (In re Erdman), 96 B.R. 978, 988 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1988).
166. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988).
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court or to testify to questions approved by the court.'67 How-
ever, absent a grant of immunity from prosecution in a later crimi-
nal proceeding, a debtor may properly assert the Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, in court
or at a § 341 meeting, while still retaining the right to be dis-
charged.16  Most courts will not allow a blanket assertion of the
privilege, but generally require that the question of whether there
is a reasonable basis for asserting the Fifth Amendment protection
be asserted on a question-by-question basis. 169
F. OTHER FACTORS APPLICABLE TO A § 727
DETERMINATION
1. Reliance on Attorney Advice
Reliance on an attorney's advice only protects a debtor to the
extent that the reliance was (1) reasonable, (2) the advice was
well informed, and (3) the advice was given by the attorney after
being provided with all relevant facts. 170 This "rule" provides lim-
ited protection, because it seems that when bankruptcy planning
violates § 727(a), courts will often find that reliance is
unreasonable. 171
2. Whether Estate Is Harmed by Transfer
Even if property transferred is exempt or if no equity
remains, some courts, including the Eighth Circuit, hold that
injury to creditors is not, as a matter of law, a requirement for the
denial of a discharge.1 72
167. 11 U.S.C. § 727(aX6) (1988).
168. See Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trogona), 732 F.2d 170, 173 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 859 (1984).
169. See In re French, 127 B.R. 434, 439 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
170. Erdman, 96 B.R. at 985. See City Nat'l Bank v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 646 F.2d
1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1981); Barnett Bank of Tampa, N.A. v. Muscatell (In re Muscatell), 113
B.R. 72, 75 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (finding that a sophisticated businessman's alleged
reliance on counsel's advice that it was not necessary to list jointly held accounts on
schedules was unreasonable).
171. See, e.g., Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 1988)
(finding that reliance on counsel's advice in liquidating nonexempt assets and transferring
proceeds of approximately $700,000 into life insurance and annuity contracts was not
reasonable); Bateman, 646 F.2d at 1224 (holding that excluding income and a gift from
bankruptcy petition on the advice of counsel was unreasonable).
172. See Mertz v. Rott (In re Rott), 955 F.2d 596, 598 (8th Cir. 1992); First Beverly
Bank v. Adeeb (In re Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339, 1343 (9th Cir. 1986); Future Time, Inc. v.
Yates, 26 B.R. 1006, 1008-09 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 712 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir. 1983). But see
Shields v. Miera (In re Miera), 104 B.R. 989,993 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989); People's State Bank
v. Drenckhahn (In re Drenckhahn), 77 B.R. 697, 705 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
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IV. PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS
A. SUMMARY OF DEBTOR-COUNSEL'S ROLE IN PLANNING
FOR BANKRUPTCY
1. Provide clients with a detailed retention letter, advising
them of the bankruptcy process and issues, and warning them that
any transfer prior to bankruptcy has some level of risk associated
with it. Require that the letter be signed and returned with an
acknowledgement that the materials have been read and under-
stood and that any terms contained therein have been agreed
upon.
2. Advise clients of the applicable law and risks. Insist that
the client make the ultimate decision as to the extent of "plan-
ning" in which to engage.
3. Be aware, and apprise clients, of criminal statutes so that
clients do not unknowingly commit a crime. Intentional false rep-
resentations made to obtain credit from financial institutions are
criminal acts.' 73 Intentional concealment, removal or transfer of
property in which another has a security interest, without the
prior consent of the secured party, is also a criminal act.17 4 A party
to a conveyance or assignment entered into with the intent to
defraud has also committed a criminal act.'7 5  Knowingly and
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
174. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-08 (1985). Section 12.1-23-08 provides as follows:
Defrauding Secured Creditors.
1. An owner of property who creates a security interest in such property may
not intentionally alter, conceal, destroy, damage, encumber, transfer,
remove, or otherwise deal with property that is subject to the security
interest without the prior consent of the secured party if that action has the
effect of hindering the enforcement of the security interest.
2. A person may not destroy, remove, damage, conceal, encumber, transfer, or
otherwise deal with property that is subject to a security interest with the
intent to prevent collection of the debt represented by the security interest.
3. A person may not, at the time of sale of property that is subject to a security
interest, or is described in a certificate provided for under section 41-09-28,
make false statements as to the existence of security interests in the
property, or as to the ownership or location of the property.
4. A violation of subsection 2 or 3 must be prosecuted as theft under section
12.1-23-02 or 12.1-23-04. Violation of subsection 2 or 3 is a class C felony if
the property has a value of more than five hundred dollars, as determined
under subsection 6 of section 12.1-23-05. In all other cases, violation of this
section is a class A misdemeanor.
Id.
175. N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-01-11 (1991). Section 13-01-11 provides as follows:
Fraudulent conveyance-Penalty. Any person who is a party to any conveyance
or assignment of any interest in real or personal property entered into with
intent to defraud prior or subsequent purchasers, creditors, or other persons
except those with security interest in the property involved, who knowingly
participates in such a conveyance or assignment, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
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fraudulently concealing assets, making of false oaths, or commit-
ting bribery, with respect to a bankruptcy proceeding, do not only
jeopardize the discharge, but are criminal offenses. 17 6
B. SPECIFIC PLANNING SUGGESTIONS/ CONSIDERATIONS
1. Begin pre-bankruptcy planning early, if possible, so that
transfers are not occurring on the eve of bankruptcy. It is advanta-
geous to have risky transfers completed more than a year prior to
the bankruptcy, although it is often not realistic to do So. 1
7 7
2. File bankruptcy before judgments are entered against
the debtor. Once a judgment is obtained, efforts to levy on assets
and satisfy the judgment will probably follow. The debtor may
then begin to consider withdrawing funds from bank accounts,
placing funds in other accounts, and other actions which increase
the risk of being denied discharge when the bankruptcy is filed. If
there is no reason to postpone an inevitable filing, then file.
3. If a married couple is contemplating bankruptcy, with
spouse A obligated on only a nominal amount of the debt and
spouse B obligated on all the debt, consider paying spouse A's
creditors, so that spouse A will not need to file bankruptcy. Such a
payment should be made outside the preference period, which
may be a year in this instance because any payment would reduce
the obligation of an insider, i.e., the other spouse, which may
extend the preference period from ninety days to one year.1
7 8
Be cautious when considering placing cash in your client's spouse's
accounts for protection from creditors prior to filing
bankruptcy. 179
4. If excess cash is available, pay nondischargeable taxes or
other potentially nondischargeable debt prior to bankruptcy,
outside the preference period to prevent payment from being
voided by a trustee under § 547 as a preference. 8 ° Even though
Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-01-12 (1991) (providing that removing property from a
county with the intent to prevent a levy or disposing of property to prevent its use for
payment of debts is a Class A misdemeanor.)
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
177. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(aX2XA) (1988).
178. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988); Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N.
Deprizio Constr. Co.), 874 F.2d 1186, 1200-01 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that if debts are
guaranteed by an insider creditors can be required to disgorge as preferences payments
received up to one year before bankruptcy.)
179. See Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Kindorf (In re Kindorf), 105 B.R. 685, 689 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1989) (determining that intent to hinder, delay and defraud creditor was inferred
from transfer of income from wages, distributions and gifts to wife who held for his benefit
and from failure to disclose relevant information in Statement of Affairs and Schedules).
180. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX7) (1988); Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 67 (1990) (holding
that payment of outstanding trust-fund taxes from debtor's general accounts prior to
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1993] PITFALLS OF PRE-BANKRUPTCY PLANNING 123
nondischargeable taxes may receive priority treatment in a Chap-
ter 7 and ultimately be paid from the estate, administrative
expenses may deplete any funds which go into the estate from the
debtor.181
5. Advise clients against transferring exempt property prior
to bankruptcy under suspect circumstances or for less than ade-
quate consideration, such as a homestead interest to a spouse,
because the effect of this transfer is to render exempt assets non-
exempt after recovery by the trustee.1 8 2
6. Make accelerated payments on the mortgage on a home-
stead or acquire a homestead if debtor does not have one. This is
the safest method of using cash and proceeds from sale of non-
exempt assets, given the current state of the law.'1 3
7. Acquire or increase other exempt assets, if the transfers
appear to be allowable given the current state of the law. Do not
acquire exempt property with borrowed money or money being
held for another person without discretionary use of the funds,
because this may give rise to a nondischargeability claim for
embezzlement. 8 4
8. If the debtor-client is a principal in a corporation, advise
that client that liability arising from commission of tortious acts
while acting for corporation, such as conversion of secured collat-
eral, creates individual liability which may not be discharged in an
individual bankruptcy proceeding. 85
9. Caution clients against incurring credit card debt when
bankruptcy were not transfers of property of the debtors and therefore not avoidable as
preferences).
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(aX7) (1988). Another risk in hoping that taxes will be paid
from the estate is that the tax agency to which the debtor is obligated may not be willing to
wait until the estate is closed to determine if it will be paid, and may continue to pursue the
debtor for collection.
182. See In re Crosier, 132 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991); 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) (1988).
183. See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
184. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX4) (1988); First Nat'l Bank v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 882
F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that embezzlement was not established where funds
received and spent were corporate debtor's subject to a security interest of creditor); Belfry
v. Cardozo (In re Belfry), 862 F.2d 661, 663 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding that obligations
which were "sufficient to support a claim of embezzlement are ones which make the
debtor's discretionary use of the payment, prior to complying with the obligations,
improper."); Kagnas v. Robie, 264 F. 92, 93-94 (8th Cir. 1920) (denying a homestead
exemption because the debtor bought merchandise on credit immediately prior to
bankruptcy and used the proceeds from the sale of the merchandise to buy a homestead,
rather than pay suppliers).
185. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Owens (In re Owens), 807 F.2d 1556, 1559 (11th Cir.
1987) (finding that the debtor was personally liable for a corporate obligation where the
debtor made a decision to dispose of the corporation's cars without turning the proceeds
over to secured creditor); Phillips, 882 F.2d at 305 (concluding that willful and malicious
conversion of collateral proceeds was not established because debtors sincerely believed
they would be able to repay creditor).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:93
having financial problems, because the obligations may not be dis-
chargeable, particularly if used to incur luxury items or if debtor
knows that he or she probably will be unable to repay the
obligation.18 6
10. Do not spend money lavishly before bankruptcy on
expensive trips, parties, gambling or similar purposes which evi-
dence a disregard for creditors.
11. If exempt assets are acquired prior to bankruptcy, do not
dispose of the assets soon after a bankruptcy filing, as this may be
indicative of acquiring the assets for the purpose of parking cash
and not in furtherance of the policies underlying enactment of
exemption legislation.'1 7
12. Withdraw funds from accounts at creditor banks (pro-
vided that the accounts are not lock-box or collateral proceed
accounts) and open accounts with banks which are not creditors.
This safeguard will prevent the creditor bank from exercising its
offset rights if it becomes concerned that its credit is at risk.
13. If bank accounts are held jointly between two people
who each contributed to the account, and one person does not
186. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XC) (1988) (finding that debts owed to a single creditor
exceeding $500 for luxury goods incurred within forty days of an order for relief under the
Bankruptcy Code or cash advances of consumer credit on an open-ended credit plan within
twenty days of the order for relief are presumed nondischargeable); see Norwest Bank Iowa,
N.A. v. Larson (In re Larson), 136 B.R. 540, 544 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1992) (finding credit card
debt incurred in Chapter 11 by business debtor did not equate with intent to defraud);
Citicorp Credit Serv. v. Hinman (In re Hinman), 120 B.R. 1018, 1021 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990)
(enumerating list of factors from which courts may infer requisite intent in cases of credit
card fraud).
In Hinman, Judge William A. Hill shared his philosophy on credit card debt, which is
sound advise for all debtors or potential debtors, in or out of bankruptcy.
There are some who place blame for credit card defaults upon the industry and
the seeming cavalier manner in which cards are issued to nearly anyone. While
the industry may well be far too lax in its card issuance policies, this court does
not believe that policy should in any respect lessen the degree of individual
financial responsibility to be imposed upon credit card consumers. It is not the
issuance or even possession of a card which results in the incredible number of
credit card driven consumer bankruptcies. Rather, it is the unbridled and
irresponsible use of credit by people who either have no cash flow consciousness
in the first place, or who conveniently leave it at the curb side when entering a
retail establishment that is at the root of the problem. To place blame on the
card issuer is akin to moralizing over the crime of shoplifting by putting the
retailer at fault for attractive merchandising efforts and for not stationing armed
guards in every isle. Each person must accept responsibility for his or her own
actions and be responsible for his or her own pocketbook. It is an unfortunate
observation of modern society that the phrase, "I can't afford it" has become
relegated to the unconscious mind of the American consumer. It is no dishonor
to shop at K-Mart nor is it dishonorable to look at up-scale merchandise and
conclude, "I can't afford it."
Id. at 1023.
187. See Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 124 B.R. 290, 297-98 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1991).
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intend to file bankruptcy, consider splitting the account in half.
Each joint holder should use his or her respective share to estab-
lish an individual account.
14. If advantageous, possible, and consistent with § 727, con-
tinue with patterns of gifting and allocation of wage checks
between spouses. Departure from the typical routine may be
risky. 18  Complete disclosure of the transfers on the bankruptcy
schedules is important. These transfers may ultimately be avoided
as fraudulent conveyances because they occurred for less than fair
value. However, if the transfers are consistent with a prior pat-
tern, the intent necessary to prevent the discharge may not be
established.
15. Ascertain that prepetition checks have cleared when
bankruptcy is filed.' 9 If they have not, the balance in the account
will be considered property of the estate.' 90 If the checks clear
after bankruptcy, the debtor may be required to pay the estate the
value of the cleared checks19' or the debtor may be denied a
discharge. 192
16. Do not lie or overtly misrepresent assets, financial condi-
tion or other factors to creditors prior to filing a bankruptcy,
because this will increase the risk of a discharge being denied.' 93
17. Maintain appropriate records which will enable the trac-
ing of all funds at the debtor's disposal for at least the one year
period prior to bankruptcy. Receipts and an accounting of cash
transactions should be kept.19 4
18. Ask clients to consider whether it is possible that any
inheritances will be received during the 180-day period following
a bankruptcy filing. Inheritances received before a bankruptcy fil-
ing become property of the estate, and available for creditors
unless permissible transfer into exempt property has occurred.
Inheritances received within six months after the bankruptcy fil-
ing also become property of the estate. 195 The discharge may be
revoked if the debtor knowingly and fraudulently fails to report,
188. See Yates, 26 B.R. at 1008-09 (denying husband's discharge because he deposited
portion of wage check in wife's account).
189. See Gepfrich, 118 B.R. 135, 138-39 (finding that a check issued by debtor for
purposes of buying annuity which cleared the day after the bankruptcy filing was an
improper post-petition transfer made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors).
190. See In re Lange, 110 B.R. 907,,910 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
191. Id.
192. See Gepfrich, 118 B.R. at 139.
193. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
195. 11 U.S.C. § 541(aX5) (1988).
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deliver or surrender such an inheritance to the trustee.1 96
19. If discharge or nondischargeability problems are antici-
pated, consider filing a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 petition because
it is possible to discharge obligations under a Chapter 11 or Chap-
ter 13 plan which would not otherwise be dischargable under
Chapter 7.197
C. BANKRUPTCY SCHEDULES PREPARATION
1. Encourage clients to prepare schedules in advance. Mis-
takes occur when they are prepared at the last minute, without
ample time to review or reflect on them.
2. If reported income in the schedules is inconsistent with
reported income on the historical tax returns, questions will be
raised, and could result in discharge being denied.'98
3. Counsel should review the statement of income and
expenses with the client, to ensure that all income and expenses
are included. If expenses are excluded, and it appears that excess
income is available, the court or the United States Trustee may
move under § 707(b) to dismiss for substantial abuse.' 9
4. Schedule every conceivable creditor. A debt to a creditor
is discharged in a no-asset case where there are no assets available
for distribution to creditors, even if there is no notice to creditors,
provided there is no evidence that the debt was fraudulently
incurred or the creditor was intentionally omitted.2 °° However,
where there are any assets available for distribution, debt owing a
creditor who is not scheduled or who has not been given other
timely notice of the case will not be discharged.20 '
5. All creditors, including those whom the debtor wants to
discharge or those whom the debtor does not want to notify, such
as credit card companies with whom the debtor wants to maintain
a relationship, must be included on the schedule of creditors. 20 2
196. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(dX2) (1988); Watson v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 141 B.R. 702,
706 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992) (finding that debtor's failure to promptly amend schedules to list
the inheritance, supported by the circumstantial evidence of failing to disclose until late in
a deposition, evidenced the wrongful intent).
197. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
198. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988).
199. Id.
200. Peterson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 72 B.R. 783, 787 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
201. Duerkop v. Jongquist (In re Jongquist), 125 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
202. See Norwest Bank Iowa, N.A. v. Larson (In re Larson), 136 B.R. 540, 544-45
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1992) (implying a need for complete schedules but nevertheless discharging
debtor of credit card debt incurred in Chapter 11, prior to conversion to Chapter 7,
because it found that the debtor overlooked scheduling the debt and because the debtor
intended to use credit cards in the Chapter 11 and continue paying on them).
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6. Err on the side of being over inclusive in reporting infor-
mation on schedules.
7. Inadvertent errors on schedules can happen and courts
and trustees are generally understanding. However, this is not
always the case and counsel should advise the client to exercise
great care and diligence in preparing schedules for a bankruptcy
filing.2° 3 Notify the trustee in writing immediately upon becom-
ing aware of errors and amend the schedules, if necessary. A case
alleging intentional misrepresentation is more difficult to establish
if the debtor or debtor's counsel expose the errors first, as con-
trasted to the trustee or creditors learning of the errors through
independent sources or from the § 341 meeting, before being
advised by the debtor.20 4
D. SECTION 341 FIRST MEETING OF CREDITORS
Counsel should review the bankruptcy schedules with the cli-
ent shortly before the first meeting of creditors so that the client is
prepared to discuss any transactions which may raise questions in
the minds of the trustee or creditors.2 °5 Questions should be
answered in a thorough, nonevasive manner.20 6 A false, material
statement made with the requisite fraudulent intent at a § 341
meeting is a sufficient ground for denying a discharge.207
E. DEALING WITH THE TRUSTEE OR CREDITORS
In contrast to nonbankruptcy litigation, a debtor's interests
are best served in a Chapter 7 proceeding by fully cooperating
with the trustee. The trustee, as compared to certain creditors,
does not come into the case with heightened emotions. The
trustee must simply become satisfied that all assets have been dis-
closed and that the debtor is entitled to a nondisputed discharge.
The most effective way for debtor's counsel to assist in obtaining
203. See Federal Land Bank v. Ellingson (In re Ellingson), 63 B.R. 271, 276-77 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1986) (finding that debtors' lack of intent to make false oath on schedules was
established by conscious approach to preparing schedules and debtors' counsel cooperation
with the trustee in disclosing the assets immediately following the first meeting of
creditors).
204. See Swicegood v. Ginn, 924 F.2d 230, 231-32 (1 lth Cir. 1991) (denying discharge
even though the debtor amended schedules after becoming aware that former wife
disclosed unlisted assets to creditor); Dignam v. McMahon (In re McMahon), 116 B.R. 857,
862 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (noting that "it is well established that subsequent disclosure
does not expunge a prior false oath.").
205. 11 U.S.C. § 343 (1988) (providing that the trustee and creditors are allowed to ask
questions at this meeting).
206. See Armstrong v. Lunday (In re Lunday), 100 B.R. 502, 507 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989).
207. Id. at 508.
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the discharge is to provide information to the trustee as requested.
Failure to provide requested information leads the trustee to con-
clude that damaging information is intentionally being withheld
and may prompt the trustee to object to a discharge. Even if there
is no merit to the claim, these cases need to be taken seriously and
are expensive to thoroughly defend.
V. CONCLUSION
Improper conduct relative to a bankruptcy proceeding may
lead to serious civil and criminal consequences. Creditors and the
United States Department of Justice are increasingly investigating
and pursuing bankrupcty fraud cases to discourage debtors and
debtors' counsel from participating in bankruptcy fraud. Counsel
who elect to advise debtors prior to and during a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding must stay abreast of the law impacting on bankruptcy
planning. First and foremost, debtor clients should be advised to
be honest with creditors and the court, and to resist the tempta-
tion to resort to dishonesty in an attempt to create short-term ben-
efits in response to current financial pressure. Second, debtors
should be led to understand that it is not always possible to protect
each and every asset from legitimate claims of creditors. A debtor
is entitled to a fresh start, not a head start. Debtors are well
advised to remember that conversion of exempt and nonexempt
assets is generally permissible, but if they become greedy in that
process, the discharge may be denied, for "when a pig becomes a
hog it is slaughtered.- 20 8
208. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
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